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Can Norms Account for Strategic Action? Information Management in Fishing as a Game of Legitimate Strategy

Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Oslo, stig.gezelius{at}nilf.no

Success in fishing depends upon knowledge of the whereabouts of fish, but fishermen are known to be secretive about this information, even when information exchange is mutually beneficial. Game-theoretical models offer explanations for this phenomenon, but also predict that making the most beneficial choices in terms of information-sharing is difficult. The ar ticle aims to demonstrate how a dialogue between traditional sociology and tools of rational choice theory can be established. It outlines practices of information management in Norwegian pelagic fisheries, arguing that a shared set of behavioural norms delimits the set of probable strategies, making a co-operative strategy emerge to the actors as the most beneficial choice. Social norms are integral par ts of the actors' strategic reasoning and facilitate rational adaptation.The ar ticle combines traditional concepts of norms and trust with game-theoretical reasoning in a model called `game of legitimate strategy'.

Key Words: fisheries • game theory • norms • rational choice • reciprocity • trust

Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 2, 201-218 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0038038507074797


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